Workers’ enterprises are not perverse: differential oligopoly games with sticky price

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2004) Workers’ enterprises are not perverse: differential oligopoly games with sticky price. p. 23. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1582.
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Abstract

We take a differential game approach to study the dynamic behaviour of labour managed (LM) firms, in the presence of price stickiness. We find that the oligopoly market populated by LM firms reaches the same steady state equilibrium allocation as the oligopoly populated by profit-maximising (PM) firms, provided that the LM membership and the PM labour force are set before the market game starts. The conclusion holds under both the openloop solution and the closed-loop solution. The result confirms the point made by Sertel (1987) in a static framework.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
workers’ enterprise, price dynamics, feedbacks
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
16 Feb 2006
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:33
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