Degenerate feedback and time consistency in dynamic games

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca ; Leitmann, George (2005) Degenerate feedback and time consistency in dynamic games. p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/1759.
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Abstract

This paper analyses the time consistency of open-loop equilibria, in the cases of Nash and Stackelberg behaviour. We define a class of games where the strong time-consistency of the open-loop Nash equilibrium associates with the time consistency of the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. We label these games as `perfect uncontrollable' and provide two examples based on (i) a model where firms invest so as to increase consumers' reservation prices, based upon Cellini and Lambertini (CEJOR, 2003); and (ii) a model where firms compete to increase their respective market shares, based upon Leit- mann and Schmitendorf (IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 1978).

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Leitmann, George
Keywords
differential games, open-loop equilibria, time consistency, subgame perfection
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
16 Feb 2006
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 14:39
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