Vertical relations and number of channels in quality-differentiated markets

Bacchiega, Emanuele ; Bonroy, Olivier (2012) Vertical relations and number of channels in quality-differentiated markets. [Preprint]
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Double marginalization causes inefficiencies in vertical markets. This paper argues that such inefficiencies may be beneficial to final consumers in markets producing vertically differentiated goods. The rationale behind this result is that enhancing efficiency in high-quality supply chains through vertical integration may drive out of the market low-quality ones, thus affecting market structure. As a consequence, restoring-efficiency vertical integration may reduce consumer surplus, even in the absence of foreclosure strategies by the newly integrated firms. From a policy standpoint, our paper suggests that input and/or customer foreclosure should not be considered as the only source of antitrust concern when assessing the effects of vertical integration.

Tipologia del documento
Bacchiega, Emanuele
Bonroy, Olivier
Parole chiave
Vertical product differentiation, Vertical integration, Buyer power
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
08 Mag 2012 15:39
Ultima modifica
08 Mag 2012 15:39

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