A Top Dog Tale with Preference Rigidities

Randon, Emanuela ; Simmons, Peter (2012) A Top Dog Tale with Preference Rigidities. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3327.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
PDF
Licence: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

With preference rigidities we find Pareto optima of an exchange economy, some of which involve unconsumed endowments. We show that such Pareto Optima can only be attained as market equilibria if there is a top dog in the initial endowment distribution who is richer than the other individuals. The most inegalitarian efficient allocation favouring the top dog is globally stable and is in the core. For endowment distributions with a top dog, the core contains efficient allocations more equal than the market equilibrium. A voting mechanism or government policy can also offset the top dog’s power.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Randon, Emanuela
Simmons, Peter
Keywords
Exchange economy; Complements; Top dog allocation.
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
05 Jul 2012 13:37
Last modified
08 Oct 2012 09:32
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^