Information and Learning in Oligopoly: an Experiment

Bigoni, Maria ; Fort, Margherita (2013) Information and Learning in Oligopoly: an Experiment. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 63. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3719. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (860). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
PDF
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (809kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper presents an experiment on learning in repeated games, which complements the analysis of players' actual choices with data on the information acquisition process they follow. Subjects play a repeated Cournot oligopoly, with limited a priori information. The econometrics hinges on a model built upon Experience Weighted Attraction learning, and the simultaneous analysis of data on the information gathered and on actions taken by the subjects. Results suggest that learning is a composite process, in which different components coexist. Adaptive learning emerges as the leading element, but when subjects look at the strategies individually adopted by their competitors they tend to imitate the most successful behavior, which makes markets more competitive. Reinforcement learning also plays a role, as subjects favor strategies that have yielded higher profits in the past.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Bigoni, Maria
Fort, Margherita
Keywords
Information, Imitation, Cournot Oligopoly, EWA learning
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
02 Jul 2013 13:08
Last modified
03 Oct 2013 08:40
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^