Lobbying in a multidimensional policy space with salient issues

Roberti, Paolo (2014) Lobbying in a multidimensional policy space with salient issues. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 33. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/3946. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (922). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We present a citizen-candidate model on a multidimensional policy space with lobbying, where citizens regard some issues more salient than others. We find that special interest groups that lobby on less salient topics move the implemented policy closer to their preferred policy, compared to the ones that lobby on more salient issues. When we introduce two types of citizens, who differ with respect to the salience of issues, we find pooling equilibria where voters are not able to offset the effect of lobbying on the implemented policy. This result is in sharp contrast with previous work on unidimensional citizen-candidate models that predict the irrelevance of lobbying on the implemented policy. In an extension of the model we provide citizens with the possibility of giving monetary contributions to lobbies in order to increase their power. With more than one lobby per dimension we have two findings. First, under some conditions only the most extreme lobbies receive contributions. Second, the effectiveness of a lobby is maximized when the salience of an issue is low in the population and high for a small group of citizens.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Roberti, Paolo
Keywords
voting, lobbying, salience, citizen-candidate
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
27 Jan 2014 14:36
Last modified
10 Feb 2014 11:14
URI

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