CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities

Lambertini, Luca ; Palestini, Arsen ; Tampieri, Alessandro (2014) CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externalities. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4067. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (959). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate a linear state dfferential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation à la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function. If the market is sufficiently large, the CSR firm sells more, accumulates more capital and earns higher profits than its profit-seeking rival.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Palestini, Arsen
Tampieri, Alessandro
Keywords
Capital accumulation, asymmetric duopoly, dynamic games
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
01 Sep 2014 14:16
Last modified
16 Mar 2015 14:49
URI

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