On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly

Lambertini, Luca (2014) On the Interplay between Resource Extraction and Polluting Emissions in Oligopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 32. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4101. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (976). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper offers an overview of the literature discussing oligopoly games in which polluti ng emissions are generated by the supply of goods requiring a natural resource as an input. An analytical summary of the main features of the interplay between pollution and resource extraction is then given using a differential game based on the Cournot oligopoly model, in which (i) the bearings on resource preservation of Pigouvian tax rate tailored on emissions are singled out and (ii) the issue of the optimal number of firms in the commons is also addressed.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca0000-0001-6353-4753
Keywords
pollution, commons, natural resources, green R&D, emission taxation, differential games
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
07 Nov 2014 08:22
Last modified
12 May 2016 07:22
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