Managerial delegation in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly

Lambertini, Luca (2015) Managerial delegation in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 25. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4159. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (990). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

I propose a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under (quasi-static) open-loop and nonlinear feedback strategies, where firms are managerial and two alternative types of delegation contract are considered. Under open-loop information, delegation expands the residual steady state resource stock. Conversely, under nonlinear feedback information the outcome depends on the structure of managerial incentives. If sales are used, once again delegation favours resource preservation. On the contrary, if market shares are included in the delegation contract, this combines with an underlying voracity effect in shrinking the steady state volume of the resource.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
dynamic oligopoly, delegation, renewable resources, feedback strategies
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
23 Jan 2015 08:57
Last modified
28 Oct 2015 13:19
URI

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