Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers

Bigoni, Maria ; Camera, Gabriele ; Casari, Marco (2012) Strategies of cooperation and punishment among students and clerical workers. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 43. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4186. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (828). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We study individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly faced with the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategies adopted, and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers, and cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior with decentralized punishment and also personal punishment when available.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Bigoni, Maria
Camera, Gabriele
Casari, Marco
Keywords
Non-standard subject pools, prisoner’s dilemma, personal punishment, artefactual field experiment, stranger matching
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
18 Mar 2015 14:00
Last modified
31 Mar 2015 13:22
URI

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