The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in complementary markets

Mantovani, Andrea ; Vandekerckhove, Jan (2012) The strategic interplay between bundling and merging in complementary markets. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 26. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4204. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (814). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In this paper, two pairs of complementors have to decide whether to merge and eventually bundle their products. Depending on the degree of competitive pressure in the market, either both pairs decide to merge (with or without bundling), or only one pair merges and bundles, while rivals remain independent. The latter case can very harmful for consumers as it brings surge in prices. We also consider the case in which one pair moves first. Interestingly, we find a parametric region where first movers merge but refrain from bundling, to not induce rivals to merge as well.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Mantovani, Andrea
Vandekerckhove, Jan
Keywords
Bundling, Merger, Strategic Interaction, Antitrust
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
30 Mar 2015 13:12
Last modified
31 Mar 2015 13:41
URI

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