On the (non) existence of a price equilibrium in delegation games with relative performance compensation

Kopel, Michael ; Lambertini, Luca (2012) On the (non) existence of a price equilibrium in delegation games with relative performance compensation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 24. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4211. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (807). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to those affecting the stability of price cartels.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Kopel, Michael
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
managerial arms, Bertrand competition, delegation, equilibrium existence
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
30 Mar 2015 13:16
Last modified
31 Mar 2015 13:47
URI

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