Are Self-regarding Subjects More Strategic?

Arruñada, Benito ; Casari, Marco ; Pancotto, Francesca (2012) Are Self-regarding Subjects More Strategic? Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 13. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4213. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (805). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

To investigate the relationship between the depth of strategic thinking and social preferences we ask subjects in an experiment to perform dictator games and a guessing game. The guessing game measures depth of strategic thinking while dictator games control for social preferences. When performing a comparison within the same degree of strategic reasoning, self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other subjects.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Arruñada, Benito
Casari, Marco
Pancotto, Francesca
Keywords
guessing game, other-regarding preferences, strategic thinking
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
30 Mar 2015 13:18
Last modified
31 Mar 2015 13:47
URI

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