Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games

Camera, Gabriele ; Casari, Marco (2015) Monitoring institutions in indefinitely repeated games. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 25. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4427. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1046). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination challenges.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Camera, Gabriele
Casari, Marco
Keywords
coordination, information, equilibrium selection, conventions, social dilemmas
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
07 Jan 2016 08:43
Last modified
07 Jun 2017 08:27
URI

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