Board of director collusion, managerial incentives and firm values

Andergassen, Rainer (2011) Board of director collusion, managerial incentives and firm values. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 27. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4443. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (795). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
PDF
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (641kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent academic research hints at the social network of board of directors as an important conduit for coordinating corporate governance policies, such as managerial pay, and curbing competition. We study a model where managers can exert unobservable cost-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Andergassen, Rainer
Keywords
Board of director collusion, managerial incentives, pay-for-performance sensitivity, firm values, managerial pay
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
25 Jan 2016 15:47
Last modified
25 Jan 2016 15:47
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^