Corporate Social Responsibility and Firms Ability to Collude

Lambertini, Luca ; Tampieri, Alessandro (2011) Corporate Social Responsibility and Firms Ability to Collude. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 21. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4461. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (778). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We examine a duopoly with polluting production where firms adopt a form of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to define their objective functions. Our analysis focuses on the bearings of CSR on collusion over an infinite horizon, sustained by either grim trigger strategies or optimal punishments. Our results suggest that assigning a weight to consumer surplus has a pro-competitive effect under both full and partial collusion. Conversely, a higher impact of productivity on pollution has an anti-competitive effect under partial collusion, while exerting no effect under full collusion. Under partial collusion, the analysis of the isoquant map of the cartel reveals that complementarity arises between the two weights.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Keywords
CSR, collusion
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
26 Jan 2016 10:28
Last modified
26 Jan 2016 10:28
URI

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