Paying Positive to Go Negative: Advertisers' Competition and Media Reports

Blasco, Andrea ; Pin, Paolo ; Sobbrio, Francesco (2011) Paying Positive to Go Negative: Advertisers' Competition and Media Reports. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 45. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4467. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (772). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper analyzes a two-sided market for news where advertisers may pay a media outlet to conceal negative information about the quality of their own product (paying positive to avoid negative) and/or to disclose negative information about the quality of their competitors' products (paying positive to go negative). We show that whether or not advertisers have negative consequences on the accuracy of news reports ultimately depends on the extent of correlation among advertisers' products. Specifically, the lower is the correlation among the qualities of the advertisers' products, the (weakly) higher is the accuracy of the media outlet' reports. Moreover, when advertisers' products are correlated, a higher degree of competition in the market of the advertisers' products may decrease the accuracy of the media outlet's reports.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Blasco, Andrea
Pin, Paolo
Sobbrio, Francesco
Keywords
Advertising, Commercial Media Bias, Competition, Media accuracy, Two-sided market
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
26 Jan 2016 11:16
Last modified
26 Jan 2016 11:16
URI

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