Prevention in Health Insurance: a Welfare Analysis of Participating Policies

Barigozzi, Francesca ; Bourlès, Renaud ; Henriet, Dominique ; Pignataro, Giuseppe (2014) Prevention in Health Insurance: a Welfare Analysis of Participating Policies. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 28. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4476. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (765). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Preventive care should be subsidized in traditional insurance contracts since policyholders ignore the benefit of their prevention choice on the insurance premium (Ellis and Manning, 2007 JHE). We study participating policies as risk-sharing agreements among policyholders who decide how much to invest in secondary prevention. We explore under which conditions these policies allow partial or even full internalization of prevention benefits in an environment with repeated interactions between policy holders. Welfare generated by the risk-sharing agreement is increasing with the size of the pool, but at the same time the pool size must not be too large for cooperation to sustain the internalization benefits.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Barigozzi, Francesca
Bourlès, Renaud
Henriet, Dominique
Pignataro, Giuseppe
Keywords
secondary prevention, positive externality on the insurance premium, long run enrollment, cooperation among policyholders
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
28 Jan 2016 11:35
Last modified
28 Jan 2016 11:35
URI

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