The coordination value of monetary exchange: Experimental evidence

Camera, Gabriele ; Casari, Marco (2011) The coordination value of monetary exchange: Experimental evidence. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 51. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4486. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (754). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
PDF
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (616kB) | Preview

Abstract

Under what conditions can cooperation be sustained in a network of strangers? Here we study the role of institutions and uncover a new behavioral foundation for the use of monetary systems. In an experiment, anonymous subjects could cooperate or defect in bilateral random encounters. This sequence of encounters was indefinite; hence multiple equilibria were possible, including full intertemporal cooperation supported by a social norm based on community punishment of defectors. We report that such social norm did not emerge. Instead, the availability of intrinsically worthless tokens favored the coordination on intertemporal cooperation in ways that networks of strangers were unable to achieve through social norms.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Camera, Gabriele
Casari, Marco
Keywords
money, cooperation, information, trust, folk theorem, repeated games
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
28 Jan 2016 11:42
Last modified
28 Jan 2016 11:42
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^