Communication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas: experimental evidence

Camera, Gabriele ; Casari, Marco ; Bigoni, Maria (2011) Communication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas: experimental evidence. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 46. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4489. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (751). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Social norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, strangers could make public statements before playing a prisoner’s dilemma. The interaction was repeated indefinitely, which generated multiple equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to credibly commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash play, and sometimes reduced it. Surprisingly, cooperation suffered when subjects could publicly commit to actions.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Camera, Gabriele
Casari, Marco
Bigoni, Maria
Keywords
coordination, cheap-talk, deception, indefinitely repeated game, social norms
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
28 Jan 2016 11:44
Last modified
28 Jan 2016 11:44
URI

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