Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition

Lambertini, Luca ; Tampieri, Alessandro (2011) Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 11. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4490. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (750). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leaders role.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Parole chiave
endogenous timing, product quality
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4490
Data di deposito
28 Gen 2016 11:46
Ultima modifica
28 Gen 2016 11:46
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4490

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