Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition

Lambertini, Luca ; Tampieri, Alessandro (2011) Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 11. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4490. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (750). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leaders role.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Tampieri, Alessandro
Keywords
endogenous timing, product quality
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
28 Jan 2016 11:46
Last modified
28 Jan 2016 11:46
URI

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