Using Auctions for Pollution Rights as Indirect Incentives for Investments in Green Technologies

Fadaee, Mehdi ; Lambertini, Luca (2011) Using Auctions for Pollution Rights as Indirect Incentives for Investments in Green Technologies. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 16. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4512. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (729). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Acquired wisdom has it that the allocation of pollution rights to firms hinders their willingness to undertake uncertain R&D projects for environmental-friendly technologies. We revisit this issue in a model where firms strategically choose whether to participate in an auction to attain pollution permits, or instead invest in green R&D, to show that, somewhat counterintuitively, a side effect of the auction is in fact that of fostering environmental R&D in an admissible range of the model parameters.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Fadaee, Mehdi
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
environmental externalities, auctions, pollution rights, pollution-reducing innovation
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
02 Feb 2016 11:34
Last modified
02 Feb 2016 11:34
URI

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