Meeting at School. Assortative Matching in Partnerships and Over-Education

Tampieri, Alessandro (2011) Meeting at School. Assortative Matching in Partnerships and Over-Education. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 31. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4515. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (726). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

This paper argues that assortative matching may explain over-education. Education determines individuals' income and, due to the presence of assortative matching, the quality of the partner, who can be a colleague or a spouse. Thus an individual acquires some education to improve the expected partner's quality. But since everybody does that, the partner's quality does not increase and over-education emerges. Tax progression to correct over-education has ambiguous effects on the educational incentives according to the individuals' ability. We test the model using the British Household Panel Survey. The empirical results support our theoretical findings.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Tampieri, Alessandro
Keywords
Assortative Matching, Over-Education
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
02 Feb 2016 11:38
Last modified
02 Feb 2016 11:38
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