Financial disclosure and the Board: a case for non-independent directors

Biondi, Yuri ; Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo ; Reberioux, Antoine (2010) Financial disclosure and the Board: a case for non-independent directors. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 29. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4553. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (689). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In listed companies, the Board of directors has ultimate responsibility for information disclosure. The conventional wisdom is that director independence is an essential factor in improving the quality of that disclosure. In a sense, this approach subordinates expertise to independence. We argue that effective certification may require firm-specific expertise, in particular for intangible-intensive business models. However, this latter form of expertise is negatively related to independence as it is commonly measured and evaluated. Accordingly, there exists an optimal share of independent directors for each company, related to the level of intangible resources.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Biondi, Yuri
Giannoccolo, Pierpaolo
Reberioux, Antoine
Keywords
Board of directors, information disclosure, accounting, intangible resources, corporate governance
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
04 Feb 2016 11:30
Last modified
04 Feb 2016 11:30
URI

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