Is Competition for FDI Bad for Regional Welfare?

Amerighi, Oscar ; De Feo, Giuseppe (2009) Is Competition for FDI Bad for Regional Welfare? Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 31. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4564. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (680). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
Documento PDF
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial (CC BY-NC 3.0)

Download (376kB) | Anteprima


We investigate the impact on regional welfare of policy competition for FDI when a multinational firm can strategically react to differences in statutory corporate tax rates and shift taxable profits to lower-tax jurisdictions. We show that competing governments may have an incentive to tax discriminate between domestic and multinational firms even in the presence of profit shifting opportunities for the latter. In particular, tax competition leads to higher welfare for the region as a whole than lump-sum subsidy competition when the difference in statutory corporate tax rates and/or their average is high enough. We also find that policy competition increases regional welfare by changing the firm's investment decision when profit shifting motivations might induce the firm to locate in the least profitable country.

Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Amerighi, Oscar
De Feo, Giuseppe
Parole chiave
Policy competition for FDI; Profit shifting; Tax discrimination
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
05 Feb 2016 11:28
Ultima modifica
05 Feb 2016 11:28

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento