A Class of Best-Response Potential Games

Dragone, Davide ; Lambertini, Luca ; Palestini, Arsen (2008) A Class of Best-Response Potential Games. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 16. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4612. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (635). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
[thumbnail of 635.pdf]
Anteprima
 Documento PDF
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0)
Download (233kB) | Anteprima

Abstract

We identify a class of noncooperative games in continuous strategies which are best-response potential games. We identify the conditions for the existence of a best-response potential function and characterize its construction, describing then the key properties of the equilibrium. The theoretical analysis is accompanied by applications to oligopoly and monetary policy games.

Abstract
Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Autori
AutoreAffiliazioneORCID
Dragone, Davide
Lambertini, Luca
Palestini, Arsen
Parole chiave
best-response potential game, conservative vector field, fictitious profit function
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Area 13 - Scienze economiche e statistiche > SECS-P/01 Economia politica
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4612
Data di deposito
15 Feb 2016 13:48
Ultima modifica
15 Feb 2016 13:48
URI
https://amsacta.unibo.it/id/eprint/4612

Altri metadati

Statistica sui download

Statistica sui download

Vedi altre statistiche

Gestione del documento: Visualizza il documento

© ALMA MATER STUDIORUM - Università d Bologna, 2007-2024.

^