Vertical integration in a stochastic framework and a nonsymmetric bargaining equilibrium

Rossini, Gianpaolo (2004) Vertical integration in a stochastic framework and a nonsymmetric bargaining equilibrium. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4763. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (527). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We go through the decision to vertically integrate or outsource in an uncertain framework. We consider two different market strategies, price setting and quantity setting and two different vertical relationships: a Stackelberg one and a bargaining one. In the first scenario, with certainty, price and quantity settings are alike, while with uncertainty the ranking changes. If the bargaining framework is adopted instead, quantity setting under uncertainty leads to an asymmetric distribution of realized gains along the vertical chain.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Rossini, Gianpaolo
Keywords
Vertical Integration, Uncertainty, Stackelberg, Bargaining
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
15 Mar 2016 09:17
Last modified
15 Mar 2016 09:17
URI

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