Identifying Reaction Functions in Differential Oligopoly Games

Lambertini, Luca ; Mantovani, Andrea (2004) Identifying Reaction Functions in Differential Oligopoly Games. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 27. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4773. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (518). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate the issue of strategic substitutability/complementarity in differential games. We prove that instantaneous best replies exist if Hamiltonian functions are multiplicative in the control variables. Otherwise, if the Hamiltonians are addively separable w.r.t. controls, a dominant strategy emerges for each player. In this case, however, imposing stationarity on the differential equations of states, one can still identify best replies at the steady state, which is ruled out by definition in static games.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
Keywords
complementarity/substitutability, differential games, reaction functions
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
09 Mar 2016 15:30
Last modified
09 Mar 2016 15:30
URI

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