The issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2003) The issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 13. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4805. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (489). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We reformulate the monetary policy model of Barro and Gordon (1983a) by using an extended game with observable delay where the hierarchy of play between the central bank and the private sector is endogenous. This allows us to endogenise the institutional setup wherein the monetary policy game takes place. We show that positive inflation may be observed due to mixed strategies rather than time inconsistency.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
monetary policy, time consistency, extended games
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
09 Mar 2016 15:03
Last modified
09 Mar 2016 15:03
URI

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