Private and Social Incentives Towards Investment in Product Differentiation.

Lambertini, Luca ; Cellini, Roberto (2002) Private and Social Incentives Towards Investment in Product Differentiation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 18. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4867. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (431). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We consider a nynamic oligopoly where firms invest to increase product differentiation and an externality effect operates in the R&D activity. We compare the steady state solutions under alternative decision rules, namely, the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium. Significant differences emerge, concerning the effect of the number of firms upon the optimal degree o product differentiation. We also compare the privat optima with the social optimum, and derive implications concerning the social diserability of different decision rules.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Cellini, Roberto
Keywords
differential games, R&D investment, product differentiation, spillover
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
17 Mar 2016 12:55
Last modified
17 Mar 2016 12:55
URI

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