Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices: Closed-Loop, Feedback and Open-Loop Solutions

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2000) Dynamic Oligopoly with Sticky Prices: Closed-Loop, Feedback and Open-Loop Solutions. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 18. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4908. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (393). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game with price adjustments. We show that the subgame perfect equilibria are characterised by larger output and lower price levels then the open-loop solution. The individual (and industry) output at the closed-loop equilibrium is larger than its counterpart at the feedback equilibrium. Therefore, firms prefer the open-loop equilibrium to the feedback equilibrium, and the latter to the closed-loop equilibrium. The opposite applies to consumers.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
differential games, loop decision rules, subgame perfection
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
21 Mar 2016 08:45
Last modified
01 Apr 2016 09:01
URI

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