Size distribution and anti-trust

Lambertini, Luca ; Sasaki, Dan (2000) Size distribution and anti-trust. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 11. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4911. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (390). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Extensive literature notwithstanding, effects of the size distribution of firms on consumers’ surplus and on social welfare leaves room for further exploration. In this paper we discover that size distribution imposes two counter-balancing effects on aggregate surplus of the industry : [i] even distribution of firm sizes typically facilitates tacit collusion compared to slightly uneven distribution, whilst [ii] very uneven distribution resembles monopoly. The trade-off between these two counterforces can make the overall welfare effect of firms’ size distribution (given a fixed number of firms) non-monotone in the degree of concentration.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Sasaki, Dan
Keywords
Competitive equilibrium, predatory equilibrium, collusive sustainability, concentration indeces.
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
21 Mar 2016 08:43
Last modified
21 Mar 2016 08:43
URI

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