Standardization and the Stability of Collusion

Lambertini, Luca ; Poddar, Sougata ; Sasaki, Dan (1997) Standardization and the Stability of Collusion. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 9. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5012. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (298). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We characterize the interplay between firms' decision in terms of product standardization and the nature of their ensuing market behaviour. We prove the existence of a non-monotone relationship between firms' decision at the product stage and their intertemporal preferences.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Poddar, Sougata
Sasaki, Dan
Keywords
RJVs, product innovation, critical discount factor.
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 Apr 2016 09:02
Last modified
05 Apr 2016 09:02
URI

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