Affirmative Priority Queueing

Sasaki, Dan (1997) Affirmative Priority Queueing. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 16. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5013. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (297). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Consider a first-come first-served queue where agents arrive randomly but their participation in the queue is voluntary and strategic. This paper shows that the introduction of priority-class discrimination (retaining first-come first-serve within each class) unambiguously improves total welfare even if agents are a priori identical, i.e. agents have a fixed outside reservation utility and their unit cost of waiting (per period) is also homogeneous across agents. Furthermore, when agents have heterogeneous outside reservation utilities, those who have low outside reservation utility should be given high priority in the queue for total welfare improvement, not only for equity.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Sasaki, Dan
Keywords
first-come first served, participation, balking.
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 Apr 2016 09:01
Last modified
05 Apr 2016 09:01
URI

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