Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly

Lambertini, Luca (1998) Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 22. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5016. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (294). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically differentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a fixed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
product quality, R&D investment, timing, extended game
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
05 Apr 2016 08:58
Last modified
09 Jun 2016 09:39
URI

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