May Delegation Affect Firms' Ability to Collude?

Lambertini, Luca ; Trombetta, Marco (1997) May Delegation Affect Firms' Ability to Collude? Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 23. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5036. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (275). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (218kB) | Preview

Abstract

In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, we show that delegation has no effect on cartel stability if managers collude, while it may hinder cartel stability when owners collude in setting the incentive schemes. If owners can choose whether to delegate or keep control of their respective firms, and both groups of individuals collude or play noncooperatively in their respective variables according to the level of intertemporal discount factor, then if managers are not able to collude in output levels, owners' delegation decision is non-monotone in the discount factor.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Trombetta, Marco
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
04 Apr 2016 10:27
Last modified
04 Apr 2016 10:27
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^