Equity, Envy and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

Denicolò, Vincenzo (1996) Equity, Envy and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 5. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5067. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (242). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (39kB) | Preview

Abstract

We show that any social choice function that always selects envy-free Pareto efficient allocations must violate Arrow's condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Denicolò, Vincenzo
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
06 Apr 2016 10:56
Last modified
06 Apr 2016 10:56
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^