Delegation and Cartel Stability

Lambertini, Luca (1994) Delegation and Cartel Stability. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 15. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5118. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (208). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, under Cournot competition. The main findings are that if only one firm is managerial, the critical discount factor is increased by the presence of a weight attached to sales, so that cartel stability is decreased, while if both are managerial the opposite holds. As a consequence, the inclusion of sales in both firms’ objective function represents an incentive towards collusion.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca0000-0001-6353-4753
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ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
10 May 2016 08:03
Last modified
11 May 2016 08:11
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