Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration

Cordella, Tito ; Datta, Manjira (1994) Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 22. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5133. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (193). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

In a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, we introduce the concept of an intertemporal Cournot equilibrium. We show that if the number of strategic agents increases without limit, the intertemporal Cournot equilibrium converges to the intertemporal Walras equilibrium only when the tune horizon for the agent is finite. If the time horizon is infinite, each strategic agent is able to exert nonnegligible market power, no matter how large their number is.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cordella, Tito
Datta, Manjira
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ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
10 May 2016 08:17
Last modified
11 May 2016 08:09
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