Login per gli autori
Cordella, Tito ; Datta, Manjira
(1994)
Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration.
Bologna:
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE,
p. 22.
DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5133.
In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE
(193).
ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text disponibile come:
Anteprima |
Documento di testo(pdf)
Licenza: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial 3.0 (CC BY-NC 3.0) Download (179kB) | Anteprima |
Abstract
In a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, we introduce the concept of an intertemporal Cournot equilibrium. We show that if the number of strategic agents increases without limit, the intertemporal Cournot equilibrium converges to the intertemporal Walras equilibrium only when the tune horizon for the agent is finite. If the time horizon is infinite, each strategic agent is able to exert nonnegligible market power, no matter how large their number is.
Abstract
Altri metadati
Statistica sui download
Statistica sui download
Gestione del documento:
