Regulating Innovative Activity: the Role of a Public Firm

Delbono, Flavio ; Denicolò, Vincenzo (1991) Regulating Innovative Activity: the Role of a Public Firm. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 24. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5247. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (117). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (213kB) | Preview

Abstract

Without spillovers and under the “winner-take-all” hypothesis, there is overinvestment in R&D in a non cooperative equilibrium. This is due to the so-called “common pool problem”, i.e., duplication of efforts. We show that a public firm can represent a useful instrument in the hands of a policymaker to mitigate such a problem. More precisely, it is provided that, in a mixed duopoly: (i) each firm invest less than in a private duopoly, (ii) although the expected time of innovation is postponed, social welfare is higher than in a private duopoly.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Delbono, Flavio0000-0001-9030-4048
Denicolò, Vincenzo0000-0001-8371-4241
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
01 Jul 2016 07:41
Last modified
01 Jul 2016 07:41
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^