Asymmetric Information in Public Provision Mechanisms

Fiorentini, Gianluca (1989) Asymmetric Information in Public Provision Mechanisms. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 17. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5333. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (77). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

An optimal mechanism fot the provision of impure public inputs to oligopolistic firms is investigated using a three stage game where in the first stage the public agency which provides the public input fixes a non-linear price schedule.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Fiorentini, GianlucaUniversità di Bologna0000-0003-4197-9924
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
19 Jul 2016 13:45
Last modified
19 Jul 2016 13:45
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