R & D Investment in Oligopoly: Betrand vs Cournot

Delbono, Flavio ; Denicolò, Vincenzo (1988) R & D Investment in Oligopoly: Betrand vs Cournot. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 24. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5366. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (48). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

Since the work of Schumpeter, it has been argued that there may exist a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. As a contribution to this debate, in this paper we compare the R&D performance of CCournot and Bertrand oligopolists. We model a one-shot noncooperative game in which firms invest in R&D, with the aim of being first in a competition for a patentable cost-reducing innovation.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Delbono, Flavio0000-0001-9030-4048
Denicolò, Vincenzo0000-0001-8371-4241
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
19 Jul 2016 13:35
Last modified
19 Jul 2016 13:35
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