Ride Your Luck! A Field Experiment on Lottery-based Incentives for Compliance

Fabbri, Marco ; Barbieri, Paolo Nicola ; Bigoni, Maria (2016) Ride Your Luck! A Field Experiment on Lottery-based Incentives for Compliance. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 16. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5458. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1089). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (816kB) | Preview

Abstract

We designed a natural-field experiment in the context of local public transportation to test whether rewards in the form of lottery prizes coupled with traditional sanctions efficiently reduce free-riding. We organized a lottery in a medium-size Italian city the participation in which is linked to purchasing an on-board bus ticket. The lottery was then implemented in half of otherwise identical buses operating in the municipality. Our theoretical model shows that the introduction of the lottery generates an increase in the number of tickets sold and that it is possible to design a self-financing lottery. To estimate the effect of the lottery's introduction on the amount of tickets sold, we matched and compared treated and control buses operating on the same day on the exact same route. The results show that buses participating in the lottery sold significantly more tickets than the control buses. The increase in revenue from the tickets sold was more than the lottery prize amount.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Fabbri, MarcoErasmus University Rotterdam0000-0002-4256-036X
Barbieri, Paolo NicolaUniversity of Gothenburg0000-0002-0807-312X
Bigoni, MariaUniversità di Bologna0000-0001-5988-6115
Keywords
Enforcement, Free-riding, Public Good, Risk Attitudes, Sanctions
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
07 Dec 2016 09:50
Last modified
08 May 2017 14:34
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^