Regulating the tragedy of commons: nonlinear feedback solutions of a differential game with a dual interpretation

Lambertini, Luca (2017) Regulating the tragedy of commons: nonlinear feedback solutions of a differential game with a dual interpretation. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche DSE, p. 28. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5519. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1096). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

A well established dynamic model describing the impact of oligopolistic interaction on a renewable resource is revisited here to illustrate its dual interpretation as a waste removal differential game. The regulatory implications are illustrated by assuming that the public agency may control market price and possibly also access to the commons. Two different formulations of the managerial or CSR objective are envisaged, based on a combination of profits and either output or the individual share of the waste stock. It is shown that if the representative firm’s objective includes the residual waste stock, there exists a unique regulated price driving to zero the steady state stock itself. Hence, the present analysis delivers some useful indications concerning an appropriate definition of the CSR objective firms should adopt.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, LucaUniversità di Bologna0000-0001-6353-4753
Keywords
waste removal, resource extraction, feedback information, regulation, tragedy of commons
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
10 Mar 2017 12:56
Last modified
07 Jun 2017 09:53
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