Voluntary Export Restraints in a Trade Model with Sticky Price: Linear and Nonlinear Feedback Solutions

Lambertini, Luca ; Palestini, Arsen (2017) Voluntary Export Restraints in a Trade Model with Sticky Price: Linear and Nonlinear Feedback Solutions. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, p. 19. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5715. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1109). ISSN 2282-6483.
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Abstract

We revisit the adoption of voluntary export restraints (VERS) in the differential Cournot game with sticky price and intraindustry trade by Dockner and Haug (1991). The analysis relies on linear and nonlinear feedback strategies, to encompass the special cases considered in Fujiwara (2010) and to show that a VER may arise in correspondence of any free trade equilibrium generated by feedback information such that competition is at least as strong as under open-loop rules. This result can be interpreted in the light of the dynamic formulation of conjectural variations due to Dockner (1992).

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, LucaUniversità di Bologna0000-0001-6353-4753
Palestini, ArsenUniversità La Sapienza Roma0000-0003-0897-382X
Keywords
differential games, intraindustry trade, VER, conjectural variations
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
23 Oct 2017 08:14
Last modified
23 Oct 2017 08:14
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