On the attainment of the maximum sustainable yield in the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model

Lambertini, Luca ; Leitmann, George (2017) On the attainment of the maximum sustainable yield in the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model. Bologna: Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, p. 13. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5720. In: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE (1112). ISSN 2282-6483.
Full text available as:
[img]
Preview
Text(pdf)
License: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial

Download (623kB) | Preview

Abstract

We reformulate the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model of natural resource extraction under the alternative assumptions of Cournot behaviour and perfect competition, to revisit the tragedy of commons vs the possibility of sustainable harvesting. We stress the different impact of demand elasticity on the regulator’s possibility of driving industry harvest to the maximum sustainable yield in the two settings. The presence of a flat demand function offers the authority a fully effective regulatory tool in the form of the exogeneous price faced by perfectly competitive firms, to drive their collective harvest rate at the maximum sustainable yield. The same cannot happen under Cournot competition, as in this case the price is endogenous and the regulator’s policy is confined to limiting access to the common pool.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, LucaUniversità di Bologna0000-0001-6353-4753
Leitmann, GeorgeUniversity of California at Berkeley0000-0002-9979-8942
Keywords
tragedy of commons, sustainability, differential games, resource extraction
Subjects
ISSN
2282-6483
DOI
Deposit date
26 Oct 2017 09:24
Last modified
26 Oct 2017 09:24
URI

Other metadata

Downloads

Downloads

Staff only: View the document

^