Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2003) Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/605.
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Abstract

We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in a duopoly where firms may either undertake independent ventures or form a cartel for cost-reducing R&D investments. By comparing the profit and welfare perfomances of the two settings in steady state, we show that private and social incentives towards R&D cooperation coincide for all admissible levels of the technological spillovers characterising innovative activity. This results stems from smoothing the investment reffort over the time horizon of the game.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Keywords
differential games process innovation R&D cooperation spillovers
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 13:58
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