Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2003) Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/605.
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We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in a duopoly where firms may either undertake independent ventures or form a cartel for cost-reducing R&D investments. By comparing the profit and welfare perfomances of the two settings in steady state, we show that private and social incentives towards R&D cooperation coincide for all admissible levels of the technological spillovers characterising innovative activity. This results stems from smoothing the investment reffort over the time horizon of the game.

Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Parole chiave
differential games process innovation R&D cooperation spillovers
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 13:58

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