Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca ; Tedeschi, Piero (2003) Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/608.
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We analyse a model of vertical differentiation focusing on the trade-off between entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low quality, versus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a superior product. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium where the leader enters with a lower quality than the follower, for low discount factors, for high costs of quality and for low consumers’ willingness to pay for quality.

Tipologia del documento
Monografia (Working paper)
Lambertini, Luca
Tedeschi, Piero
Parole chiave
vertical differentiation product innovation monopoly rent
Settori scientifico-disciplinari
Data di deposito
17 Giu 2004
Ultima modifica
17 Feb 2016 13:58

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