Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

Lambertini, Luca ; Tedeschi, Piero (2003) Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/608.
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Abstract

We analyse a model of vertical differentiation focusing on the trade-off between entering early and exploiting monopoly power with a low quality, versus waiting and enjoying a dominant market position with a superior product. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium where the leader enters with a lower quality than the follower, for low discount factors, for high costs of quality and for low consumers’ willingness to pay for quality.

Abstract
Document type
Monograph (Working Paper)
Creators
CreatorsAffiliationORCID
Lambertini, Luca
Tedeschi, Piero
Keywords
vertical differentiation product innovation monopoly rent
Subjects
DOI
Deposit date
17 Jun 2004
Last modified
17 Feb 2016 13:58
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