The issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game

Cellini, Roberto ; Lambertini, Luca (2003) The issue of time inconsistency revisited as an extended game. DOI 10.6092/unibo/amsacta/611.

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Abstract

We reformulate the monetary policy model of Barro and Gordon (1983a) by using an extended game with observable delay where the hierarchy of play between the central bank and the private sector is endogenous. This allows us to endogenise the institutional setup wherein the monetary policy game takes place. We show that positive inflation may be observed due to mixed strategies rather than time inconsistency.

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Monografia (Working paper)

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